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La integración financiera internacional ha implicado un mayor riesgo de contagio entre países, 
requiriendo una respuesta más rápida ante una crisis. A su vez, la integración financiera (y 
comercial) internacional ha sido acompañada por una propagación de la democracia y de la 
participación política. ¿Ha amenazado el incremento del sistema participativo la velocidad 
requerida por los mercados crecientemente integrados? Encontramos que la estructura de 
manejo del FMI y los procesos democráticos han cooperado para facilitar una respuesta rápida 
a las crisis. El tiempo que transcurre desde una crisis hasta la implementación de un programa 
del FMI ha sido menor mientras más severa ha sido la crisis. La velocidad de respuesta del FMI 
ha aumentado a través del tiempo y ha sido sensible a indicadores de vulnerabilidad, 
especialmente a reversiones repentinas en los flujos de capitales (“sudden stops”). La cercanía 
política de los países con los Estados Unidos ha sido un factor importante para una rápida 





Growing international financial integration has implied greater threat of contagion across 
borders, requiring quicker response to crises. However, financial—and trade—integration have 
been accompanied by the spread of democracy and political participation. Do more voices in the 
political process impede the need for speed required by financial markets? We find that the 
Fund’s operational approach, its governance structure, and domestic democratic processes have 
cooperated to facilitate faster response to financial crises. The time span from a crisis to the 
negotiation of an IMF program has been smaller the more serious the crisis. The response speed 
appears to have increased over time, with consideration to a broader range of vulnerabilities, 
especially to sudden stops in capital inflows. Affiliation to the United States has proved 
increasingly more valuable for the rapid conclusion of a program. And, democracies are 
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1. Introduction 
Much scholarly attention has focused on the factors that lead the International 
Monetary Fund to lend to countries that face balance of payments stress. The questions posed 
have been: why does the IMF (or the Fund) lend and why do countries borrow?
1 
Policymakers have also been concerned with the amount of lending, especially for countries 
facing “exceptional” balance of payments difficulties.
2 In contrast, surprisingly little attention 
has been directed to analyzing the speed at which the Fund has responded to crises. While a 
few case studies have documented the pressure to react quickly (Boughton 1997 and Bordo 
and James 2000), there has been no systematic attempt to examine how rapidly, in fact, the 
IMF has responded by lending to countries in the midst of external crises and what factors 
have contributed to the response speed.    
And, yet, with financial markets moving ever faster, the metric of speed is a valuable 
one, not only to assess how the Fund has faced the challenge but also as a lens on broader 
questions of international political economy. That is the purpose of this paper. 
The speed of lending is of particular interest in the context of financial crises. The 
Fund’s role is predicated on the basis that markets may “overreact to and aggravate bad 
news” Boughton (1997, p. 3). That overreaction may inflict unnecessary damage to the 
country facing the crisis, but, worse, may infect other countries. Hence, orderly management 
of crises, under condition that the country adopts sensible policies, is a public good provided 
                                                 
1 Bird (1996) reviews the early research; recent contributions include Thacker (1999), Vreeland (2002), and 
Barro and Lee (2005). 
2 The Supplemental Reserve Facility was created to meet “large short-term financing” needs. See IMF (1997).    
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by the Fund. It is not sufficient that the Fund lends when a country faces a crisis. It is 
necessary that the lending occur in a timely manner. 
The pressure on response speed has only increased with time. Noting the emergence 
of the Fund’s role as a crisis manager during the Suez crisis of 1956, Boughton (1997) 
regards the Latin American debt crisis of the early 1980s as pivotal in highlighting the need 
for speed to counteract the risk of crises spreading beyond the original source of distress. 
Bordo and James (2000) point to the growing depth of international financial markets as 
reinforcing the need for speed, a challenge felt acutely during the string of emerging market 
crises in the second half of the 1990s. These discussions continue today within the Fund, 
where the task is viewed as responding expeditiously and predictably to maintain 
international financial stability while ensuring appropriate safeguards for the judicious use of 
Fund resources. This, in turn, has led to the possibility of ex ante conditionality and 
prequalifying borrowers, who would then have ready access to Fund resources. The 
challenge to balance speed and safeguards remains to be resolved (IMF 2006). 
In examining the factors that may accelerate lending decisions, our research design 
has been motivated by a number of questions. Does the Fund respond faster when a crisis is 
more severe? Have the response speed and the factors that are incorporated in vulnerability 
assessments changed over time? Also of interest is the Fund’s governance structure, and, in 
particular, how major shareholders have accommodated this demand for speed. An even 
more intriguing question is whether the pressures for speed have curtailed democratic 
deliberation. 
Democracy is of particular interest because its recent evolution has, in large measure, 
paralleled increased economic openness. The mid-1970s, about when our study commences,   
3 
is also the start of the so-called “third wave” of global democratization, following a brief 
reversal in the previous decade (Huntington 1991). Quinn (2000) has noted the striking 
comovement of democracy and financial liberalization. This we show for the period 1975-
2004 in Figure 1, which plots the average measure of democracy and capital account 
openness across countries in each year, normalized to lie between 0 and 100. Also trade 
openness started an upward climb in about the mid-1980s, at which point trade and financial 
openness became closely correlated. While Quinn (2000) offers an engaging account of the 
dynamics of this comovement, our interest lies in whether economic and political openness 
were in conflict. Specifically, if economic openness demanded a higher speed of policy 
response, did political openness impose limits? Does democratic deliberation slowdown 
decision making? Or do common interests underlying economic and political participation 
ensure a timely response? 

























1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
year
Global Democracy Global Trade Openness
Global Capital Account Openness
 
Notes: For each variable, the global average (across countries) in a particular year is 
represented on scale from 0 to 100. The measure of democracy is based on the Polity IV 
scale from -10 to +10. Trade openness is the ratio of trade-to-GDP. Capital account openness 
is based on the Chinn-Ito Index. Further details of each variable are in the data appendix.   
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With these considerations in mind, this paper maps the variation in the IMF’s speed 
of lending and assesses the determinants of this speed. The focus is on the IMF’s stand-by 
arrangement (SBA), the Fund’s principal instrument for dealing with short-term balance of 
payments difficulties. Once agreed upon, SBA’s allow countries to draw up to a pre-specified 
amount, typically over a period of 12-18 months.
3 Our contribution lies, first, in documenting 
the frequency of SBAs that could be considered a response to crises as distinct from 
programs in noncrisis situations. Of course, this distinction involves judgments both in 
identifying a crisis (which we do using a methodology proposed by Kaminsky and Reinhart 
1999) and in tying a program to the crisis. To be transparent, the dictates of statistical 
analysis require that we define a relatively low level of distress for an event to count as a 
crisis. Next, we describe how the speed of crisis lending has evolved over time.  
But primarily, we conduct a statistical analysis of the factors that contributed to 
determining the response speed. More precisely, we study the factors that have influenced the 
time gap between the onset of a crisis and the initiation of a Fund-supported program, at 
which time Fund resources—and, often, other complementary financing—become available 
to alleviate pressures on a country’s external financial position. In principle, this time gap has 
two components, which we do not distinguish: the time the country takes to approach the 
Fund and the period thereafter during which a program is agreed upon. The implication also 
is that the ultimate decision on the program depends on the country’s demand for and the 
Fund’s supply of speed. Such a distinction has been made has been made in the context of 
                                                 
3 Other programs, such as the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) and the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility, 
have longer maturities than the SBA and, as such, have a more developmental focus. A few SBA’s have longer 
maturities and the distinction between an EFF and an SBA may have blurred over time. Also, an SBA may be 
combined with the Supplemental Reserve Facility to allow larger levels of borrowing.    
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program determination with the aid of bivariate probits (e.g., Vreeland 2002). While these 
refinements should eventually be pursued even in the context of speed, we adopt a more 
reduced-form approach with explanatory variables including both demand and supply 
factors. The three sets of influences we examine are: (a) the severity of the crisis; (b) the 
borrower’s relationship to the governance structure of the IMF; and (c) the implications of 
democratic institutions.  
Between 1977 and 2002, of the about 300 SBAs concluded, about 200 were 
associated with crises that occurred in the previous two years. Thus, while two-thirds of the 
SBAs were linked to crises, others presumably reflected noncrisis situations, including 
rolling over existing SBAs where a country continued to remain vulnerable. For the programs 
associated with a crisis, the median spell from crisis to program was 17 months (Table 1), the 
relatively large number reflecting the low threshold in the definition of a crisis. The data, 
however, points to a decline in the spell, or response time, which fell from a median of 19 
months during 1977-1985 to 15 months in the years after 1985. This divide around the year 
1985 corresponds roughly to Boughton’s (1997) characterization of the Latin American crisis 
as being a turning point in the consideration and priority that the Fund accorded to response 
speed, and supports his expectation that the Fund would have sought to move more quickly. 
Moreover, about a third of the programs that did follow a crisis did not have to be rushed 
because an SBA was in place when the crisis occurred.
4 Notice, however, there is some 
indication in the data that an existing program was put to greater use as a buffer in the second 
                                                 
4 The implication is that the presence of an IMF-supported program has not guaranteed that a crisis would not 
occur!   
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period (as seen by the larger gap between the spell with and without an existing program), 
allowing more time for designing a new program. 
  Using count data models, our regression results can be summarized into four main 
findings, which together imply that the Fund’s operational approach, its governance 
structure, and the domestic democratic processes have all cooperated to accommodate the 
need for greater response speed. First, greater country vulnerability does matter: the more 
severe a crisis, the faster a program is likely to be put in place. Second, the response to 
vulnerability appears to have increased over time. Moreover, the range of vulnerability 
indicators that bear on the decision-making process appears to have expanded from a concern 
with rapid exchange rate depreciation to include debt-servicing capability and, especially, the 
risk of a sudden stop in capital flows. Third, a particularly robust finding is the increase over 
time in the value of affiliation to the United States for the rapid conclusion of a program. 
Finally, while the role and relevance of democracy in determining the pace of program 
negotiation is nuanced and complex, the dictates of financial globalization and the 
consequent need for speed do not appear to have undermined domestic democratic processes. 
While political participation appears to have slowed decisions until the mid-1980s—when 
the new democratic wave was still in its early stages—that effect apparently disappeared 
thereafter just trade and financial openness began a decisive and sustained upward trend. But 
the evidence also is that where institutional constraints limited the scope for arbitrary action, 
democracies were able to accommodate the needs of political participation and remain 
sensitive to time pressures.  
  The next section describes the construction of the spell and the econometric approach 
and challenges. This is followed successively by an examination of the role of external   
7 
vulnerability; the possibility that the response to vulnerability has changed over time; the 
influence of the borrower’s relationship to the IMF’s governance structure; and the 
consequences of democratic participation and stronger checks and balances. A final section 
concludes.   
 
2. The Empirical Approach 
  The starting point of the analysis is the defining the time of a crisis. From that time to 
the negotiation of the IMF program is the span or the “spell,” which is the dependent variable 
of interest. This section describes the construction of the spell and then discusses the 
econometric methodology for analyzing the determinants of the spell. 
 
The spell: crisis and response 
In defining a crisis, we were guided by the Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) gauge of 
the pressures faced by a country’s currency.
5 These pressures can be captured by significant 
variations in the exchange rate and foreign currency reserves. The larger the depreciation and 
the loss of reserves, the greater is the pressure. Kaminsky and Reinhart propose a composite 














                                                 
5 The focus on currency crises is determined by the practical difficulty of dating, for example, banking and debt 
crises.   
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“e” is the end-of-the-month exchange rate, “R” is the end-of-the-month reserves’ level, and 
the Δ operator refers to monthly change.
6 The rate of change of reserves is normalized by the 
ratio of the standard deviation of exchange rate (σe) to the standard deviation of rate of 
change of reserves (σr). In Kaminsky and Reinhart, a country is defined as entering a crisis in 
the month when this indicator is three standard deviations off its mean for that country. Our 
indicator is softer: it turns on when the index is one standard deviation above its mean. This 
allows us to identify a larger number of events as “crises,” providing us with more data 
points to analyze the duration from a crisis to a Fund program. We compensate for this by 
allowing, in the regressions, for continuous variation in the severity of the crisis, as measured 
by the extent of the depreciation and exchange rate loss. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) show 
in their Figure 4 that a crisis evolves over time to reveal its severity. Thus, a slow drain of 
reserves is followed initially by a sharp depreciation of the exchange rate. The “crisis” month 
is typically the first in which a (generally overvalued) exchange rate makes a sizeable move 
following the loss of reserves. Exchange rate depreciation then continues (while reserves 
generally bottom out). Hence, the degree to which the exchange rate depreciation persists and 
is subsequently followed by even more serious difficulties, such as a sudden stop in capital 
flows determines how the severe the crisis is. In our empirical analysis, we examine the 
significance of this variation in crisis severity. 
An observation enters our sample when an IMF stand-by arrangement (SBA) was 
preceded by a crisis in the prior two years. We use the IMF’s “Date of Arrangement” as the 
date on which the program came into effect. The span between the month of arrangement and 
                                                 
6 Some also include the change in interest rate in this pressure index. However, the lack of comparable interest 
rate data across a broad range of countries typically limits this addition.   
9 
the month of the crisis gives us our dependent variable, the spell. Since we have no direct 
way to link a crisis to a particular SBA, we assume that if a program was negotiated within 
two years of the crisis, it was related to that particular crisis.
7 Clearly, the two-year time 
window within which we scanned was set arbitrarily. As with the definition of the crisis, it 
was a compromise to generate a sufficient number of observations for analysis. In this way, it 
was possible to relate around 200 SBA programs to our crisis indicator during the time span 
January 1977 to December 2002.
8  In practice, because the right-hand-side explanatory 
variables were sometimes missing, we work with a sample of about 175 observations.   
  As noted in the introduction, for the entire sample, the median time between crisis 
and program initiation was 17 months. There was considerable variation in the spell, with the 
25
th percentile value of 9 months and the 75
th percentile value of 21 months. Some programs 
were rapidly negotiated, the 1995 Mexico SBA in 1 month the 2002 Brazil and Uruguay 
SBA’s in less than 2 months.    
The presumption is that speed is necessary to prevent an economic slide in the 
country hit by a crisis while also limiting contagion to other countries. For a first look at the 
country’s circumstances, we examine the growth contraction in the year of the crisis and the 
recovery in the three years thereafter. In line with Boughton’s periodization and our 
subsequent analysis, we divide the sample period into two parts, 1977-1985 and 1986-2002. 
Table 2 shows that growth shocks were greater in the first period, as seen in the larger 
negative growth rates of per capita GDP in the year of the program. This was so whether a 
                                                 
7 If there were multiple crises within the two-year period prior to the particular program, the first crisis was used 
to define the spell. 
8 After 2002, the data constraint arises from the lack of availability of the UN voting data for compiling the 
variable to represent political affinity to the United States.   
10 
program was in place or not. Following the shock, there is evidence of mean reversion in 
growth rates. For instance, in the three years following the start of the program, the bounce 
back in growth was greater in the first period with it lower initial growth rates, than in the 
second period. Similarly, if an existing program was in place, the growth shock was milder 
and the gain in growth was smaller. 
The evidence in Table 2 is suggestive that the Fund responded faster where growth 
was slowing more rapidly. In both periods, the spell from crisis to program was shorter, the 
greater the initial distress. And, moreover, faster intervention was associated with a greater 
gain in growth from pre-program levels. While thus there is support for the presumption that 
the role of the Fund was to prevent a slide in growth rates, the evidence is not conclusive. 
Because of the tendency to mean reversion, there was more scope for post-program gain 
where there was greater distress. Also, the countries that received faster intervention, while 
achieving greater gains, typically, grew at a slower rate in absolute terms in the three years 
following program initiation, presumably because they faced more endemic problems. Thus, 
whether Fund intervention helped sustain or accelerate long-term growth is a more complex 
enquiry, which we do not pursue here. 
 
Econometric approach 
We are dealing here with “count” data: our dependent variable takes on integer values 
above zero. For count data, the Poisson model is the benchmark, with the alternatives 
generally built as extensions to deal with the restriction implicit in the Poisson’s variance   
11 
structure. For a random variable, “y” that follows the Poisson distribution, the probability 
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The parameter, λ, thus defines the distribution. In particular, the expected value and 
the variance of y are equal to λ, i.e.,  () Ey λ =  andvar( ) y λ = . For economic applications, λ 
is treated as a function of the variables of interest, represented by the vector x. As such, the 
outcome for a particular observation “i”, “yi”—which, in our case, is the “spell” between the 
crisis and program initiation—follows a Poisson distribution with the parameter i λ , 
conditional on the vector of attributes “xi,” the observed influences, 
 
() ii i y Poisson λ x ∼ , where  exp( ) ii λ β = x  
 
The econometric task is to estimate vector β, which contains the response parameters of 
interest. Note, that larger values of the elements of β imply a larger spell and hence a slower 
speed of response. Thus, for any observation “i,” conditional on observing the vector of 
attributes “xi,” the probability of observing an outcome “yi” is given by: 
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This probability function forms the basis for defining the likelihood function over the set of 
observations, and the parameters are estimates are obtained by maximizing the function. The 
expected value and the variance now are: 
                                                 
9 The presentation and notation here follows Winkelmann and Boes (2006). Early development of count data 
models was presented by Hausman, Hall, and Griliches (1984). A widely used text book treatment is Cameron 
and Trivedi (1998).    
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( ) exp( ) ii i Ey β = xx  var( ) exp( ) ii i y β = xx  
Notice that as the expected value increases, so does the variance, implying heteroscedasticity. 
However, a concern is that the variance may, in fact, rise even faster. If present, this 
“unobserved heterogeneity,” would underestimate the variance and, hence, the standard 
errors of the estimates. Thus, if the true Poisson parameter is  i λ    and  i ε represents the 
unobserved heterogeneity, then,  i λ   is related to the observed i λ as follows: 
 
exp( ) ii i λ βε =+ x    
 
exp( )exp( ) exp( ) iii i i i i uu λ βε βλ == = xx    
 
exp( ) ii u ε = , and it is assumed without loss of generality that  () 1 ii Eu = x  
and
2 var( ) ii i u =σ x .  It follows that the expected value of i λ   is i λ , which implies that the 
Poisson parameter estimates are not biased. However, the Poisson model underestimates the 
variance, which now is:  
22 var( ) ii i ii y λ λ =+ σ x  
 
The problem is referred to as one of “over dispersion.” A commonly used solution is the 
Negative Binomial model, which is based on the further assumption that  i u  has a gamma 






− σ = , 
2 var( ) (1 )exp( ) ii i i y β =+ σ xx . 
  A more complex likelihood function ensues, which can be found in standard 
references such as Cameron and Trivedi (1998) or Winkelmann and Boes (2006). But while   
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it is expedient to employ a Negative Binomial model to allow for additional heterogeneity, 
there are costs to doing so. The model specifies a very specific error structure of the 
unobserved (and, hence, omitted) variables, with a very specific distribution. In practice, it 
remains important to search for these unobserved variables directly. Thus, in their seminal 
contribution, Hausman et al. (1984) point out that addition of plausible explanatory variables 
is an important first step, which should have the effect of reducing the unobserved 
component of the heterogeneity. In their application, they note, for example, that allowing for 
time variation in the effectiveness of R&D in generating patents reduces such heterogeneity 
and hence provides for a better empirical specification. As they also note, the same purpose 
is served by fixed effects—in our case, country and time fixed effects. The country fixed 
effects imply that unchanging but unobserved country-specific factors influence the spell; 
and the time fixed effects allow for unobserved effects in different years, e.g., threat of 
financial contagion across countries.  
But there remain limits to adding explanatory variables. One solution lies then in 
correcting for standard errors. As Winkelmann and Boes (2006, p. 289) point out, “there are 
many possible reasons, apart from unobserved heterogeneity, why the conditional variance in 
the Poisson model would depart from the conditional mean.” The departure has 
consequences similar to those arising from heteroscedasticity in linear regression models: 
“the parameter estimates remain consistent, but the usual variance matrix is inconsistent and 
the estimator is inefficient.” They recommend using the Poisson model with robust standard 
errors. They caution, moreover, that a mechanical resort to alternative estimators is risky 
since the alternatives may fail even in generating consistent estimates if the underlying   
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assumptions are violated. Such would be the case for a Negative Binomial model if the 
unobserved heterogeneity was not gamma distributed. 
  The procedure we follow, therefore, is to gradually build up the Poisson model by 
adding explanatory variables and, in particular, allowing for time variation in response. 
Throughout we include country and time dummies and report robust standard errors clustered 
on the country. Use of country dummies is possible since virtually all countries in the sample 
have multiple programs, allowing control for unchanging country-specific features that may 
condition the negotiation with the IMF. We provide comparisons with the Negative Binomial 




3.  Economic Vulnerability and Speed of Response 
While preserving international stability requires acting expeditiously, program design 
may imply proceeding more cautiously. In responding to financial crises, does the IMF 
accord priority to speed of response necessary for stemming a country’s external 
vulnerability or is the focus, instead, on the time needed to design complex reforms to 
reverse the conditions that led to the crisis? If a country facing a crisis is a victim of events 
beyond its control, speed is unequivocally of the essence. But typically the crisis reflects the 
accumulation of imbalances from policy errors. Reversing policy is needed to set the country 
                                                 
10 The Negative Binomial model also includes country and time dummies, as recommended by Allison and 
Waterman (2002). These authors point out that the “fixed-effects” Negative Binomial model proposed by 
Hausman et al. (1984) is not a true fixed-effects model and suggest including fixed effects directly, advice we 
have followed. Also, the Poisson model can be interpreted as a duration model with a constant hazard rate. For 
robustness check, we ran duration models with different assumptions about the hazard rates and results are 
qualitatively similar. These estimations are not reported in the paper but they are available upon request.   
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on a more sustainable path and, in doing so, to safeguard the Fund’s resources being loaned 
to the country. Balancing the need for speed with protecting its resources has been a 
continuing challenge for the Fund. The operational question is whether the policy 
conditionality accompanying a Fund-supported program can be agreed on rapidly. While 
some programs (including with deep, possibly intrusive, conditionality) have been put 
together quickly, the presumption is that this will generally not be the case.  
Throughout, the regressions control for the presence of a pre-existing IMF program at 
the time of the crisis. As expected, and as reported in Table 3, if a program is already in 
place, all else equal, the existing program presumably provides an umbrella for Fund 
assistance and hence reduces the urgency for a new program.
11 With that control in place, this 
section explores how the severity of the crisis influences the speed of response. To that end, 
we employ several measures to assess the country’s vulnerability, with a focus on the 
country’s balance of payments position. First, in line with Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), 
and as noted above, we consider a crisis more severe the larger is the loss of reserves (in the 
six months before the date of the crisis) and the greater is the exchange rate depreciation (in 
the six months after the date of the crisis).
12 The results are as expected. A larger depreciation 
and a larger loss of reserves are, in fact, associated with a faster response speed (a smaller 
spell). The level of statistical significance does vary across specifications. Exchange rate 
depreciation is always significant at the conventional 5 percent level in this full sample. 
Reserve loss is significant at either the 10 or at the 5 percent significance levels. 
                                                 
11 The Fund can modify the existing program to accommodate the new post-crisis situation, through a new 
“letter of intent” and fresh disbursement 
12 We considered somewhat different time spans, but with qualitatively similar results.   
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  Second, we assess the influence of global conditions at the time of the crisis. Here the 
results are less conclusive. While several possibilities exist, one that is often considered 
important is the role of “global” interest rates. Typically, this is proxied by a U.S. rate, given 
the dominance of U.S. capital markets. We use the Federal Funds rate, reflecting the concern 
that a tight U.S. monetary policy is associated with restricted emerging market access to 
international capital (Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart, 1996). A higher Federal Funds rate is 
actually associated with a slower program conclusion (Columns 1 and 4), although the 
coefficient is not significant (see Eichengreen and Mody, 1998 for a discussion of the 
offsetting effects of U.S. monetary policy). The petroleum price variable has a positive 
coefficient though again it is not significant. Higher petroleum prices also have offsetting 
effects: they damage some current accounts (requiring external assistance) but they also 
increase surpluses in oil-rich countries and recycling of these surpluses ease conditions in 
capital markets and hence reduce the pressure to respond speedily (see also Gupta, 
Eichengreen, and Mody 2008). The possibility that these two effects of petroleum price have 
changed in relative strength over time is pursued below.
13 
  Next, in Table 4, we consider a variety of measures in the year the program was 
initiated. Where the spell is short, they also reflect conditions close to the crisis; for longer 
spells, they capture the evolution following the crisis and the conditions closer to the decision 
on the IMF program. The finding is that the debt service-to-exports ratio and the occurrence 
of a systemic banking crisis apparently do not, on average, speed up an IMF program. In 
                                                 
13 It is also likely that petroleum price will influence countries differently, depending, for example, on whether 
they are oil importers or exporters. However, inclusion of country dummies implies that controlling for country 
characteristics an increase over time in the prevailing petroleum price at successive crises reduced the urgency 
of a needed response from the IMF.   
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contrast, a sudden stop in capital flows is a call to action and produces a quick response. This 
is consistent with the Fund’s mandate to stem the after-shocks from developments in 
international capital markets. A more rapid growth rate, not surprisingly, slows down 
program speed, as the descriptive statistics in Table 2 had suggested. Inclusion of growth rate 
reduces somewhat the strength of the sudden stop variable—again, not surprising since 
sudden stops are correlated with slower growth. Note also that the variables representing 
exchange rate depreciation and loss of reserves maintain their signs, but the level of 
significance of the latter declines, suggesting further correlation between the vulnerability 
variables.  
The test diagnostics for the Poisson regressions in Table 2 suggest that “over 
dispersion” (variance of the Poisson parameter greater than its mean) cannot be rejected. As 
discussed above, robust standard errors help correct for the possibility that the standard errors 
are underestimated and the fact that the Negative Binomial regression gives similar results 
indicates that there is merit to the specification employed. In the spirit, however, of Hausman 
et al. (1984), a question of interest is whether the unobserved heterogeneity reflects changes 
over time in the responsiveness to the triggers that lead to initiation of IMF programs. In 
other words, has there been a change in how quickly a Fund program is established for a 
given exchange rate depreciation? Has the demand for speed increased with more 
encompassing financial globalization? The answer appears to be a clear “yes.” 
 
4.  Changes over Time 
The debt crises of the 1980s highlighted the need for speed in responding to crises, 
reflecting the increasing vulnerability to rapid capital outflows. By Boughton’s (1997, p.3)   
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assessment, prior to the international debt crisis of 1982, “... the Fund had helped countries 
through numerous crises, but its role in those cases was essentially similar to its noncrisis 
lending activities.” However, “... when the 1982 crisis erupted, the Fund’s response quickly 
broadened into a more systemic function.” In particular, one country’s challenge to service 
its debt placed other countries at risk since lenders’ balance sheets were weakened and/or 
lenders perceived risks as correlated across countries. These lessons, he concludes, were 
learnt gradually but came to be incorporated in the Fund’s operational approach by the 
second half of the 1980s, as the Fund increasingly viewed itself as a “crisis manager.”  
Bordo and James (2000, p. 32-33) also draw attention to the pressures to act quickly. 
They point to the growing reliance of emerging market governments and businesses on 
borrowing from dispersed lenders through international capital markets. Already, according 
to Boughton, Mexico’s default on bank debt in 1982 had raised spillover and systemic 
concerns and alerted the Fund on the need for speed. The next big test was Mexico’s 
“tesobono” crisis of 1994-1995. The significant shift towards capital markets implied that: 
“...much more rapid action was required, and also a greater commitment of funds, 
because the number of actors was so much greater.  It was impossible to use the 
strategy of 1982, and corral the foreign investors (who were now not banks, but 
instead were represented in innumerable mutual and pension funds). There was a fear 
of a global contagion, and a belief that the only way to limit such contagion lay in the 
extension of some protection to investors.”  
 
The trend has been relentless. With financial markets larger and more integrated, 
small shifts in sentiment can severely hurt not only the country directly affected but can, 
through various channels of contagion, draw other countries, including so-called “innocent 
bystanders,” into the financial turbulence. To limit this damage, speed is an important 
element of the policy response.    
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We explore these considerations in two different ways. First, we combined the crisis 
metrics into a consolidated “vulnerability” indicator. One such indicator is the first principal 
component of the country-specific vulnerability measures, which include exchange rate 
depreciation, reserve loss, debt service ratio, and whether the country experienced a sudden 
stop or a systemic banking crisis.
14 The first principal component, which explained about 30 
percent of the variation in vulnerability, captured a crisis that was associated with some loss 
in reserves, followed by a large depreciation, and then by a sudden stop. We allowed the 
response to vulnerability and petroleum price to vary over time, in the spirit of Hausman et 
al. (1984).  
The results are reported in Table 5. In columns (1) and (2), the diagnostics for both 
the Poisson and the Negative Binomial regressions still indicate the presence of over 
dispersion but both approaches produce rather similar results. The interaction between the 
vulnerability index and time is negative and statistically significant. Thus, over time, the 
coefficient on the vulnerability index becomes increasingly negative: alternatively stated, as 
time has gone by, the same degree of vulnerability has elicited a more rapid response. The 
petroleum price variable, taken by itself, has a negative sign (with borderline statistical 
significance). In the early years of the sample, then, an increase in petroleum price hurt a 
country’s current account and elicited a more rapid program response. But, over time, 
reflected in the positive and significant coefficient on the interaction between petroleum price 
and time, this effect waned and, in fact, a higher petroleum price was associated with a 
slower response. The evidence is not conclusive—not least because the sign on the petroleum 
                                                 
14 Addition of growth in per capita income to this list maintained the sign and statistical significance of the 
findings reported below.   
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price variable, while staying positive for the later part of the sample, is unstable in terms of 
statistical significance. However, the evidence does point to a change from a negative effect 
to one that was either positive or neutral.  
Finally, these same regressions also show that the time trend itself has a negative 
coefficient. The trend variable is a black box and not too much can be read into it. But it 
again implies a tendency for a speedier response, one that reinforces the tendency to respond 
more urgently to a particular level of vulnerability. Institutional learning—both within the 
IMF and its member states—probably contributed to the ability to meet the demand for 
speed.  
Next, we check the results obtained with the time-trend interactions by dividing the 
sample into two parts: 1977-1985 and 1986-2002. The first period captures the second oil 
shock (in 1979) and its aftermath; it is also the period of rapid build up of international debt, 
followed by the debt crisis, centered on Latin America. Unable to repay debt used to finance 
large current account deficits, several countries had to restructure their external debt, were 
cut off temporarily from sources of external credit, and experienced negative growth 
(Edwards 1995 and Table 2 above). The crisis, as Boughton has emphasized, was a turning 
point in the Fund’s recognition of the need for speed. In the second period, the consolidation 
following the Latin American debt crisis initially implied a withdrawal of foreign capital 
flows from emerging markets but then witnessed a renewed inflow of international capital 
that culminated in “irrationally exuberant” lending and the string of emerging market crises. 
Since the two time periods cannot be dated exactly, we present some alternatives below. 
  Three findings emerge (Table 6). First, the presence of an existing program at the 
time of a crisis had little effect in the first period but was used for significant breathing room   
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before the initiation of a new program in the second period.
15 Thus apparently, in the early 
years of the sample, a crisis required the development of new policy priorities and hence 
recourse to a new program-support arrangement. In contrast, in the second period, while 
some programs were initiated very rapidly, greater recourse to ongoing programs to channel 
resources and foster adjustment policies allowed for deliberation even as capital inflows and 
outflows speeded up. 
The two other findings from dividing the time periods mirror those of the time-
varying effects of vulnerability and petroleum price observed in Table 5. We see here that the 
response to vulnerability is more aggressive (with the caveat that an existing program 
permitted some latitude). Also, the change in the influence of petroleum price is confirmed. 
Between 1977 and 1985, a higher petroleum price, likely through its effect on a country’s 
current account deficit, invited a more rapid IMF response. After 1985, a higher petroleum 
price possibly offset the negative effect by recycling petrodollars back through the capital 
account, reducing the urgency of response. It is possible that recycled petrodollars were more 
a part of capital markets in the second period than in the first, when they were largely 
confined to slower-moving international banks. To some extent, then, there is the implication 
that while larger capital flows posed more of a threat in the second period, the size of the 
international capital markets also provided financial recourse to supplement IMF resources, 
which could as a consequence be held back, at least in some instances.  
                                                 
15 This result was not evident above by simply interacting the existing program dummy with time, but holds up 
strongly and consistently whenever the sample is divided into two parts. Since in both periods about one-third 
of the crises were associated with existing programs, the result is not the consequence of a difference on that 
account.   
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The test statistics are encouraging. The hypothesis of over dispersion is rejected for 
the first period and the second period, if that is thought to have started from 1988. The 
second period, either from 1984 or 1986 still tends to indicate the presence of unobserved 
heterogeneity, implying further search for omitted variables. 
 
4. The Borrower’s Relationship with the Fund 
A feature of IMF governance, emphasized by Barro and Lee (2005), is the share of a 
country’s quota in the aggregate “subscriptions” (funding) from all member countries.
16 
Barro and Lee find that a larger quota share raises the likelihood of a Fund program. Other 
research, however, is less supportive of this conclusion (see, for example, Eichengreen, 
Gupta, and Mody 2008). Countries with larger quota shares may have somewhat greater 
clout but they may also be more reluctant to draw on the Fund for reputational reasons. 
Moreover, as the British example following the Suez crisis shows, a significant quota may 
yet prove insufficient. Boughton (2001) notes that the British, facing a run on the sterling in 
the aftermath of the 1956 Suez crisis, looked to the “apolitical” support of the IMF to draw 
on the large amounts to which they were “virtually entitled” as one of the two major 
founding countries and the second-largest member. But success in doing so hinged on 
garnering U.S. backing through compliance with the U.S.-supported United Nations’ 
resolution to resolve the political crisis.   
                                                 
16 “Quota subscriptions generate most of the IMF's financial resources. Each member country of the IMF is 
assigned a quota, based broadly on its relative size in the world economy. A member's quota determines its 
maximum financial commitment to the IMF and its voting power, and has a bearing on its access to IMF 
financing.” http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/quotas.htm.    
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A growing number of statistical studies have concluded that political and economic 
affinity with the major IMF shareholders places a country in a stronger position to obtain 
IMF support. Thacker (1999) first showed that countries that have tended to vote with the 
United States in the United Nations were also more likely to receive IMF program support. 
Barro and Lee (2005) found that UN voting concordance and larger trade shares with the 
United States were associated with stronger probabilities of obtaining IMF lending as well as 
with a larger size of lending. Unlike in other studies, Barro and Lee (2005) also found similar 
effects vis-à-vis European shareholders. Broz and Hawes (2006) find that private financial 
lobbies influence U.S. Congressional votes in favor of IMF quota increases. Along with 
Oatley and Yackee (2004), they also report that, all else equal, the likelihood of lending and 
the amount of IMF lending is higher the greater is the exposure of U.S. money center banks 
in the borrowing countries.
17  
Our results are reported in Table 7.
18 We revert here to identifying the specific 
vulnerability variables to examine their roles separately rather than in a composite indicator. 
We present results for the two periods, with the full set of variables used so far and then 
pared down to allow for multicollinearity.  Column (2) is a more parsimonious version of 
column (1) for the first period (i.e., before 1986). In that period, it appears that the two 
sources of vulnerability were a country’s currency depreciation and a rise in the petroleum 
price. This lends some plausibility to a view that most crises during this period had their 
                                                 
17 They find much weaker evidence  
18 A broader set of Fund incentives and capabilities for response could be considered but metrics for these are 
not easy to define. Similarly, of Fund conditionality and its intrusiveness could impact response speed. Once 
again, persuasively measures of conditionality (beyond just the number of conditions) are required.    
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origins primarily in current account imbalances.
19 Although both IMF governance variables 
have the expected negative sign, implying that a larger quota and closer affiliation to the US 
helped speed up program negotiation, neither of the two is significant. In column (3), we add 
the country’s per capita GDP (in PPP terms). This addition is another effort to control for 
institutional and other omitted variables. The results reported remain unchanged but we do 
find in the first period that countries with higher per capita incomes were prone to more 
speedily conclude negotiations. Presumably, stronger institutions helped. 
  For the second period, starting in 1986, the results are different in important respects 
(columns 4 and 5). The exchange rate depreciation produced a much faster Fund response 
than in the first period. Moreover, a broader range of vulnerability indices appear to have 
exercised influence. The occurrence of a sudden stop was particularly potent. Loss of 
reserves and higher debt-service to export ratio also elicited a faster response, although their 
statistical significance is reduced when the country’s per capita income and growth rate are 
also included in the regression, suggesting multicollinearity. Also, as reported above, the 
existing program dummy is positive and significant, reaffirming the use in the second period 
of existing programs to provide support when a new crisis emerged. The petroleum price 
variable remains positive though is not significant at the 5 percent level.  
The IMF quota share is, as in the first period, negative but insignificant. There is, 
however, a key difference with respect to the first period. Now closer affinity to the U.S. 
appears significantly associated with faster program negotiation. It is as if during this latter 
period the broader sources of vulnerability in the context of faster moving capital markets 
                                                 
19 Their manifestation as debt crises with collateral implications for international banks and, hence, for possible 
contagion, raised the broader issues of the need for speed.   
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increased the value of speed and induced countries to use their political links to ensure timely 
decisions in the context of higher risks from delays. This result echoes Thacker’s (1999) and 
Oatley and Yackee’s (2004) findings. They report that the relevance of affinity with the U.S. 
in securing access to IMF lending increased sharply in the late 1980s. We find that same 
trend for the speed of response. Thacker (1999) notes but leaves unresolved the reason for 
this shift. The conclusion of the Cold War may have led some to expect that the U.S. interest 
in political alliances would diminish over time. While we do not pursue this question in any 
great depth, results in the next section suggest that economic interests became a more salient 
basis for political alliances, in line with Oatley and Yackee (2004) and Broz and Hawkes 
(2006). 
  With the addition of the governance variables in Table 7, even the results for the 
1986-2002 period show no evidence of over dispersion. A longer “second period” starting in 
1984 fails the over dispersion test and shows considerable differences in results from that 
starting in 1986. In particular, the value of political affiliation to the United States kicks in 
after 1986. Clearly, these are not formal tests given our short time periods and, as such, our 
assumption of the timing of the break in 1985 should be treated as indicative. 
 
5.  Has Globalization Curtailed Deliberative Democracy? 
The influence of democracy on response to crises is not unambiguous. Democracies 
are inherently slow because they are based on the obligation to encourage consensus. It could 
be that more deeply-rooted, deliberative democracies—with more voices included in 
achieving a policy consensus—slow down the negotiations in agreeing on IMF programs. 
However, fast-moving financial markets may trump deliberation. Quinn (2000) even argues   
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that the interests supporting political participation and economic openness are aligned 
because they view each as reinforcing the other. As such, the curtailment of deliberation may 
be a conscious choice backed by institutions that permit rapid decisions. As such, the 
question is whether democracies are able to undertake quick action when circumstances so 
require.
20 
Of course, empirical implementation is not straightforward. Democracies come in 
many varieties. And the variations, which imply differing degrees of voice and 
accountability, have significant implications for economic decisions. The conventional 
measure of political participation in democratic processes is the Polity IV measure. This 
measure ranges for -10 representing the most autocratic regime to +10 for the most 
democratic. As others have done (see Quinn 2000 and also the Polity IV webpage
21), we 
divide regimes into three categories. Observations with values of -5 to +5 are the base group 
(with the democracy dummy taking the value zero): those with higher values are democratic 
(and the dummy variable takes the value 1) and those with lower values are autocracies (with 
the dummy variable defined as -1).
22 In addition, for our purpose, Henisz’s (2002) measure of 
veto points is particularly attractive. To contain the possibility of arbitrary decision making, 
democratic institutions may introduce checks and balances. The PolConIII indicator, which 
                                                 
20 While we have chosen to focus on democratic institutions as conditioning country incentives and capability 
for responding to crises, a variety of other political factors could, in principle, be influential. We leave that 
exploration for further research. 
21 http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm 
22 In practice, various authors choose different cut off points. Our key results do not appear sensitive to the exact 
definition.    
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we use here, measures the extent to which the legislature can constrain the executive.
23 More 
veto players can voice interest in a range of policy alternatives and the ensuing debate can 
delay decisions. This possibility that veto players slow decision making has, to our 
knowledge, not been tested. The focus, instead, has been on documenting an association 
between more veto players and better investment and growth outcomes (see, for example, 
Henisz, 2002). The unstated assumption has been that while more veto points may result in 
slower decisions, the institutional integrity resulting from the greater checks and balances 
fosters more carefully-considered and hence superior decisions. Also, from the point of view 
of research design, the Henisz variables show greater variability over time within a country 
than do most institutional variables. 
What do the results show? In Table 8, we pull together our key findings along with 
the additional results on the role of democracy. Note in column 1, for the whole sample, the 
democracy dummy variable is not significant. When we add the measure of executive 
constraints (PolConIII), where a higher value implies more veto points, the negative sign on 
the variable, implies that more veto points have actually been associated with more rapid 
response. Note, interestingly, that the introduction of executive constraints increases the point 
estimate and the t-statistic for the democracy dummy. The implication seems to be that 
democracies have (at least two) divergent tendencies: political participation may slow things 
down but institutions that curtail arbitrary decision making are also given the flexibility to 
make quick decisions. 
                                                 
23 PolConV adds the judiciary’s veto potential and also weights the number of veto points by partisan 
composition (i.e., when a potential veto point is occupied by an actor with the same party affiliation as the 
executive it does not count). The results are qualitatively similar with PolConV.   
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These two facets of democracy are especially evident in the first period. Notice again 
that the democracy dummy by itself is insignificant. But when the executive controls variable 
is introduced then both become significant. More democracy is associated with slower 
decisions but executive constraints increase decision speeds. Presumably, democracies with 
weaker constraints are practice, subject to strong lobbying pressures from interest groups. 
Unchanneled, they slow things down. Constraints are helpful because they bring greater 
structure to the process. Also, as implied by Vreeland (2002), where more veto players exist, 
the executive has greater incentive to seek external support. In a crisis that incentive is 
exercised. The implication also is that democracies with larger veto points do allow escape 
clauses for such events. Finally, the Heinsz constraints variable may mainly be a measure of 
broader institutional quality. The accompanying policy credibility permits more rapid 
program negotiation. However, notice that the veto points variable it is significant even 
though GDP per capita is included in the regression.   
 In the second period, the democracy dummy is never significant. It could be that the 
“wave” of democracy that emerged in the mid-1970s was still in its early stages during our 
first period, 1977-1985, and that political participation had not matured in many of the new 
democracies. Participants learned over time. The results for the second period continue to 
show that the political constraints variable has a negative sign, but the magnitude of the 
coefficient and its significance decline. This is especially so if the second period is 
considered to start in 1986. But a further examination suggests that an interesting interaction 
between economic openness and politics may have been ongoing, which further sharpens the 
results.   
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If more openness to international markets in the second period called for more rapid 
response, was it also the case that more open countries responded quicker? One constraint on 
this analysis is the limited data on capital account openness, especially but not only in the 
first period. However, a measure of trade openness, the sum of exports and imports 
normalized by GDP, is available. The results we report here with trade openness are largely 
corroborated by the smaller samples using the Chinn-Ito measure of capital account 
openness. Moreover, relative to first period, the second period shows a sharp rise in 
correlation (from about zero to over 0.3) between trade and capital account openness 
(mirroring at the country level the aggregate trends in Figure 1).  
With those preliminaries, the results in Table 9 show that openness by itself does not 
influence speed. In the second period, however, the loss of reserves leads to more prompt 
action, the more open the economy is.
24 Thus, the effective response to loss of reserves (from 
column 4 of Table 9) is 0.71 + 0.01*Trade/GDP. This is plotted in Figure 2(a) along with a 5 
percent confidence interval band. For lower levels of trade-to-GDP, reserve loss is actually 
associated with slower response and for the lowest 10 percent of the observations of the 
trade-to-GDP ratio, the effective coefficient is marginally significant. However, as the trade-
to-GDP ratio increases, particularly beyond 65 percent, reserve losses begin to be viewed 
with greater concern, leading to more rapid program conclusion. Notice in Figure 2(b) that 
the trade-to-GDP ratio itself is never significant. 
                                                 
24 Other measures of crisis severity did not generate interesting results.   
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Two by products of this exercise suggest interactions between economic openness 
and politics. First, the executive constraints variable is now significant even in the second 
period starting 1986 and with a point estimate that is much closer to that in the first period. 
The inference is that some open countries experiencing loss of reserves had low executive 
constraints. Once that influence is controlled for, the value of executive constraints is clearer 
even in the second period. Second, the U.S. affinity variable reduces in significance in the 
second period (though it still has a p-value of about 0.07 and a point estimate that is 
considerably larger than in the first period). This is the consequence of much greater 
correlation between trade openness and the U.S. affinity variable in the second period 
(relative to the first). Thus, there is some basis to the possibility that over time, in an 
increasingly integrated world economy, U.S. political alliances are being driven by mutual 
commercial interests.  
   
31 
6. Conclusions 
This paper has made a first effort at mapping the Fund’s response speed and 
examining its determinants. One of our conclusions is that the Fund’s approach to speed has 
shifted in important ways since the mid-1980s as the pace of financial globalization has 
increased. The relevance of financial integration is further supported by the finding that the 
more open the economy the faster it responded to reserve losses in the second period. But the 
data are limited and identifying these shifts is no easy matter. The results, although consistent 
with the Fund’s increasing assumption of a crisis manager’s role in integrating global 
economy, should be regarded as a benchmark for review and further analysis.  
The common theme for the entire period of our study, from 1977 to 2002 is that the 
Fund has responded faster when the threat of an economic slide has been greater. From 1977-
1985, crises took the form of current account distress, accompanied by large growth shocks. 
More severe varieties of these crises motivated the Fund to move faster, but the pressure to 
do so was less than after about 1985. The Latin American debt crisis, instigated by the 
Mexican default in 1982, created greater awareness of international spillovers and systemic 
risks. As international capital markets became more prominent, new facets of vulnerability 
were revealed. The threat of a sudden stop, in particular, drew quick Fund attention as did 
debt service obligations and reserve losses (for more open economies) in determining the 
response speed. Recognizing the salience of these factors was, apparently, necessary to 
contain the spread of the crisis with a view to maintaining international financial stability. 
We did not pursue the difficult question of whether the Fund’s intervention helped raise the 
country’s growth rate: that was not the intent of the intervention, in any case. Rather, growth 
appears to have recovered, more so the greater the initial shock. While this may have mainly   
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reflected mean reversion, the finding does speak to the ongoing operational discussion on 
design of rapid access Fund facilities. Prima facie quick and predictable delivery of support 
necessary can help roll back a crisis while safeguarding the Fund’s financial position.  
In line with case studies and statistical analyses, the role of the United States has 
appeared as an important one. The results suggest that the U.S. has facilitated rapid decisions 
and that this role has increased over time. The evidence in this paper also suggests that this 
greater U.S. role has been associated with a shift from the Cold War period to greater interest 
in economic alliances in an ever more integrated global market place. 
The more intriguing results relate to the functioning of democracy in the midst of a 
crisis. With the onset of a new wave of global democratization in the mid-1970s, political 
participation apparently hindered rapid response. However, even in that early period, it 
appears that institutional checks that imposed constraints on executives were actually 
associated with more rapid program negotiation. We infer that to imply that the lack of 
formal constraints may only mask rigidities, while formal constraints allow for organized and 
credible choices, an inference that is consistent with the findings of many others that more 
constraints lead to better economic outcomes. Our contribution here is that more constraints 
need not slow the policymaking process. In the second period, political participation appears 
to have matured at least to the extent that it no longer slowed response speed. The 
constructive role of executive constraints continued into the second period, though perhaps in 
a more muted form. Overall, it appears that democracies have adapted to the need for speed. 
Thus, domestic democracy rather, than being subordinated to global finance, has sought to 
grapple with the novelty of these new generation crises and has attempted to come to grip   
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with the appropriate mechanisms of reform. If true, this is an outcome that is good for 
democracy and for the future of financial globalization. 
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Table 1: The Spell—from Crisis to Standby Arrangement (SBA) 
  Duration (median, in months) from Crisis to Standby Arrangement  
[in parentheses, average number of SBAs per year] 
  No existing program  With Existing program 
at time of crisis 
All SBAs 
1977-1985 17 
[6]      
21 




[4]      
18 
[2]     
15 
[6] 
All SBAs  16 
[5]      
19 
[2]     
17 
[7] 
Note: As discussed in the text, these SBAs refer only to those that were associated with a 
crisis. 
 
Table 2: Change in per capita GDP growth rates following SBA 
 
 1977-1985  1986-2002 



































            
All SBAs  -0.6  1.2  1.8  0.1  1.3  1.2 






























            
Spell ≤8 -2.7  0.4  3.1 -1.6  1.0  2.6 
Spell 9-16  -1.6  0.9  2.5  0.1  2.0  1.9 
Spell ≥17 0.1  1.4  1.3  0.4  1.2  0.8 
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Table 3: Country and Global Conditions at the Time of Crisis 
 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Dependent  Variable:  Spell 
 Poisson  Regression  Negative Binomial Regression 
Existing    0.27  0.23 0.23 0.31 0.25 0.25 
program dummy  [3.93]***  [3.33]*** [3.35]*** [3.42]*** [2.77]*** [2.78]***
Exchange rate   -0.12  -0.11  -0.11  -0.11  -0.11  -0.11 
depreciation [3.23]***  [3.42]*** [3.66]*** [2.72]*** [2.77]*** [2.77]***
Loss of   -0.04  -0.04  -0.03  -0.04  -0.04  -0.03 
reserves [2.20]**  [2.13]**  [1.81]* [1.88]* [1.92]*  [1.98]** 
Federal funds   0.03  0.02    0.02  0.01   
rate [1.16]  [0.81]   [0.86]  [0.46]  
Log of petroleum    0.33  0.39    0.47  0.50 
price    [0.82]  [0.97]  [0.94]  [1.00] 
 
Observations  178  178 178 178 178 178 
log likelihood  -564.64  -562.83 -563.40 -549.10 -547.49 -547.59 
Notes: 1. Coefficients for country and year dummies are not reported; 2. Robust z statistics in 
brackets; 3. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 4: The Role of Economic Conditions Following the Crisis 
 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) 
 Dependent  Variable:  Spell 
 Poisson  Regression  Negative Binomial Regression 
Existing    0.23  0.22 0.21 0.24 0.24 0.23 
program dummy  [3.25]***  [3.34]*** [3.11]*** [2.72]***  [2.73]*** [2.53]**
Exchange rate   -0.09  -0.09  -0.09  -0.09  -0.08  -0.09 
Depreciation [3.54]*** [3.23]*** [3.47]*** [2.42]** [2.22]** [2.28]**
Loss of   -0.03  -0.02  -0.03  -0.03  -0.03  -0.03 
Reserves [1.50]  [1.49]  [1.58] [1.73]*  [1.68]*  [1.83]* 
Log of petroleum  0.41  0.41  0.48  0.52  0.52  0.57 
price [0.98]  [0.97]  [1.14] [1.05] [1.04] [1.21] 
 
Debt service-  -0.00  -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
to-exports [0.25] [0.29]  [0.37] [0.42] [0.48] [0.58] 
Sudden  stop  -0.46  -0.46 -0.39 -0.48 -0.49 -0.41 
 [2.03]**  [2.05]**  [1.81]*  [2.67]*** [2.74]*** [2.30]**
Systemic      -0.08    -0.10   
banking  crisis    [0.64]    [0.89]   
Per capita       0.01      0.01 
GDP  growth     [1.72]*    [1.95]* 
 
Observations  178  178 176 178 178 176 
log likelihood  -557.20  -556.80 -548.73 -543.64 -543.25 -536.33 
Notes: 1. Coefficients for country and year dummies not reported; 2. Robust z statistics in 
brackets; 3. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
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Table 5: Changing Response to Vulnerability  
 (1)  (2) 
 Dependent  Variable:  Spell 
 Poisson  Regression  Negative Binomial Regression 
Existing program dummy  0.18  0.19 
 [3.08]***  [2.30]** 
Vulnerability 0.04  0.04 
 [0.75]  [0.68] 
Vulnerability*Time -0.01  -0.01 
 [2.24]**  [2.14]** 
Log of petroleum price  -0.85  -0.89 
 [1.84]*  [1.98]** 
Log of petroleum price*Time  0.16  0.17 
 [3.58]***  [4.17]*** 
Time trend  -0.71  -0.72 
 [3.60]***  [4.22]*** 
 
Observations 178  178 
log likelihood  -535.17  -529.83 
Notes: 1. Coefficients for country and year dummies not reported; 2. Robust z statistics in 
brackets; 3. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Table 6: Before and After the Latin American Debt Crisis 
  
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Dependent  Variable:  Spell (Poisson Regression) 
 1977-1985  1984-2002  1986-2002  1988-2002 
Existing program dummy  0.04  0.34  0.45  0.49 
 [0.34]  [3.21]***  [3.40]***  [2.54]** 
Vulnerability -0.05  -0.07  -0.11  -0.12 
 [2.12]**  [2.18]**  [2.75]***  [2.63]*** 
Log of petroleum price  -0.52  1.49  1.36  1.10 
 [1.79]*  [3.59]***  [2.79]***  [1.78]* 
Observations 79  122  99  84 
log likelihood  -223.53  -345.85  -266.07  -221.15 
Notes: 1. Coefficients for country and year dummies not reported; 2. Robust z statistics in 
brackets; 3. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 7: IMF Governance 
  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Dependent  Variable:  Spell (Poisson Regression) 
 1977-1985  1986-2002  1988-
2002 
Existing    0.02 0.04 0.01 0.53 0.46 0.54 
program dummy  [0.12]  [0.29]  [0.11] [3.60]***  [3.58]***  [3.62]*** 
Exchange rate   -0.11  -0.11  -0.14  -0.57  -0.39  -0.46 
depreciation [3.35]***  [3.14]***  [3.74]*** [2.65]***  [1.92]*  [2.14]** 
Loss of   -0.02      -0.10  -0.14  -0.21 
reserves [1.22]      [1.40] [2.15]**  [1.92]* 
Log of   -0.59  -0.60  -0.75  0.80  0.90  0.15 
petroleum price  [2.14]**  [2.24]** [2.89]***  [1.71]*  [1.89]*  [0.23] 
 
Sudden stop  0.27      -0.66  -0.81  -0.64 
 [0.91]      [3.39]***  [5.07]***  [3.91]*** 
Debt service-  0.01      -0.01  -0.01  -0.01 
to- exports  [1.01]     [1.41]  [1.90]*  [2.12]** 
Per capita   0.00      0.01     
GDP  growth  [0.08]    [1.56]    
 
IMF  quota  -0.98 -0.87 -1.38 -2.70 -2.42  2.33 
share [0.90]  [0.89]  [1.47] [1.03] [0.95] [0.67] 
UN voting   -0.23  -0.32  -0.60  -2.05  -1.72  -1.67 
affinity with US  [0.46]  [0.82] [1.39]  [3.84]*** [3.10]*** [3.11]*** 
Log per capita       -1.46  -1.32     
GDP     [2.31]**  [1.36]     
Observations 77 79 75 98 99 84 
log  likelihood  -215.12 -222.83 -209.82 -248.03 -253.13 -211.00 
Notes: 1. Coefficients for country and year dummies not reported; 2. Robust z statistics in 
brackets; 3. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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     Table  8:  Does  Democracy  Matter? 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
                             Dependent Variable: Spell (Poisson Regression) 
   1977-2002  1977-1985  1986-2002 1988-2002
                
Existing  0.27 0.24 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.47 0.44 
program dummy  [3.20]***  [2.85]***  [0.22] [0.16] [0.10] [3.42]***  [3.01]*** 
Exchange  rate -0.10 -0.11 -0.14 -0.12 -0.10 -0.47 -0.60 
depreciation [2.83]***  [2.72]*** [3.76]***  [2.55]**  [3.39]*** [2.09]**  [1.97]** 
Loss  of    -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01  -0.004  -0.08 -0.05 
reserves  [1.16] [0.94] [1.04] [0.54] [0.36] [0.97] [0.52] 
Log of   0.36  0.24  -0.73  -0.60  -0.82  0.82  0.37 
petroleum price  [0.90]  [0.64]  [2.04]**  [1.46] [2.78]*** [1.51]  [0.59] 
                       
Debt service-  -0.003  -0.01  0.01        -0.01  -0.01 
to-exports  [0.72] [1.15] [1.27]        [1.37]  [1.92]* 
Sudden stop  -0.35  -0.28  0.41        -0.55  -0.38 
   [1.66]*  [1.31]  [1.48]        [2.57]**  [1.93]* 
Per capita   0.01  0.01  0.01        0.02  0.01 
GDP  growth  [1.14] [0.99] [0.43]        [1.91]*  [0.84] 
                      
UN  voting    -0.24 -0.17 -0.30 -0.52 -0.88 -1.89 -1.88 
affinity with US  [0.71]  [0.48]  [0.61] [1.11]  [2.23]** [3.44]***  [3.52]*** 
Log  per    -0.68 -0.82 -1.73 -1.40 -1.52 -1.22 -1.02 
Capita GDP  [1.62]  [1.92]* [2.64]***  [2.22]** [2.51]** [1.20]  [0.94] 
Democracy    0.08 0.13 0.03 0.04 0.24 -0.06 0.05 
dummy  [0.78] [1.34] [0.26] [0.35] [2.72]*** [0.38]  [0.23] 
Executive     -0.84        -1.68  -0.52  -0.96 
constraints     [2.29]**        [4.30]***  [1.24]  [2.25]** 
                 
Observations  173  173  75 75 75 98 84 
log  likelihood  -535.95 -530.78 -208.29 -210.57 -204.28 -247.77 -207.85 
 Notes: 1. Coefficients for Country and year dummies not reported; 2. Robust z statistics in brackets;      
3.* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
   
42 
Table 9: Economic Openness and Politics 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Dependent  Variable:  Spell (Poisson Regression) 
      
 1977-2002  1977-1985  1986-2002 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Existing  program  0.24 0.23 0.05 0.44 
dummy  [2.94]***  [2.84]*** [0.44] [2.74]*** 
Exchange rate   -0.11  -0.11  -0.10  -0.19 
depreciation [2.77]***  [2.73]*** [3.00]***  [0.79] 
Loss of   -0.01  0.1  0.01  0.71 
reserves [0.91]  [1.43] [0.08]  [2.15]** 
Log of   0.23  0.26  -0.9  0.72 
petroleum  price  [0.63]  [0.72] [2.75]*** [1.34] 
      
Debt service-  -0.01  -0.01    -0.01 
to-exports [1.22]  [1.32]    [2.54]** 
Sudden stop  -0.26  -0.27    -0.51 
 [1.24]  [1.26]    [2.96]*** 
      
Per capita GDP growth  0.01  0.01    0.02 
  [1.05]  [0.90]  [1.57] 
UN voting   -0.17  -0.14  -0.66  -1.18 
affinity with US  [0.49] [0.40] [1.11]  [1.81]* 
Log  per  -0.81 -0.81 -1.36 -0.99 
Capita GDP   [1.91]*  [1.87]* [1.77]*  [1.14] 
Democracy Dummy   0.13  0.13  0.23  -0.25 
  [1.37]  [1.30] [2.38]** [1.30] 
Executive Constraints  -0.86 -0.86 -1.74 -1.24 
  [2.26]**  [2.25]** [3.97]*** [2.49]** 
Trade-to-GDP ratio  -0.001  -0.001  -0.004  -0.0003 
  [0.24] [0.34] [0.57] [0.07] 
Loss of reserves interacted    -0.003  0.0002  -0.01 
with the trade-to-GDP ratio    [1.55]  [0.10]  [2.45]** 
      
Observations 173  173  75  98 
log  likelihood  -530.72 -528.36 -203.88 -244.36 
Notes: 1. Coefficients for Country and year dummies not reported; 2. Robust z statistics in 
brackets; 3.* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
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Data Appendix 
To dependent variable (Spell) is the number of months between the first “crisis” that 
occurred in a time window of two years preceding the month of approval of an IMF program. 
Thus the maximum value that this variable can take is 24. To define a crisis we construct an 














Where “R” is the monthly level of reserves and “e” is the monthly exchange rate. 
e σ and  R σ  are, respectively,  the standard deviations of the exchange rate changes  and  of 
the reserves changes. A crisis month is one in which the index is off its mean by at least a 
standard deviation.  
The other variables used in the study and their sources are described in the following 
table. 
      Variable                             Description and Source  
Consumer 
Price Index 
IFS, serie (64…zf) 
Exchange Rate  National Currency Per US Dollar. Monthly Periodicity (end of period). 
IFS, serie (..AE..ZF). 
 

















Participation of each country’s quota in the total of quotas of countries 
included in the analysis. In percentage points. IFS, serie (.2F.SZF) 
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Appendix I:   Desription and Sources of Variables (cont) 
UN voting  Data ranges from -1 (least similar interests) to 1 (most similar interests).  
The Affinity of Nations Index database. Erik Gartzke, Columbia University. 
 
Sudden Stops  As in Eichengreen, Gupta and Mody  (2008). 
GDP per 
capita 
PPP terms. From Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn 
World Table Version 6.2, Center for International Comparisons of 
Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania, September 
2006.  
 




From Gerard Caprio, World Bank Finance Group. Available at: http://econ-
www.mit.edu/files/1370. 
PolconIII  Estimates the constraints imposed by veto points. Available at: http://www-
management.wharton.upenn.edu/henisz/ 
PolconV  Similar to PolconIII but also includes two additional veto points: the 
judiciary and sub-federal entities. Available at: 
www.management.wharton.upenn.edu/henisz 
Democracy  Presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express 
their preferences about alternative policies and leaders. Increasing scale 
from -10 to +10. Source:  Polity IV Project, Center for Global Policy, 




The Chinn-Ito index of capital account openness based on the IMF’s 
detailed tabulations of restrictions on cross-border transactions in its annual 




Measured as the ratio of trade(exports plus imports)-to-GDP. Source: World 
Bank, World Development Indicators. 
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